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2023-01-31
中印能在印度洋共存嗎？
更新時(shí)間：2022-08-24 08:38:30作者：未知
導(dǎo)讀：編者按：近日，斯里蘭卡頂住印度的強(qiáng)大壓力，最終同意中國遠(yuǎn)望5號船8月16日?？克估锾m卡南部漢班托塔港進(jìn)行補(bǔ)給，彰顯了斯里蘭卡的主權(quán)和中斯友好。清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波，8月20日在新加坡《海峽時(shí)報(bào)》發(fā)表評論文章指出，中國在印度洋有巨大利益，中國人民解放軍必須加強(qiáng)其在印度洋的存在，中印海軍艦艇勢必會(huì)更頻繁地在印度洋海上相遇，如何和平共存是個(gè)問題。隨著中美競爭加劇，印度對美國的重要性必定會(huì)增加。但是，如果中美競爭加劇，印度在印度洋的回旋余地就會(huì)隨之縮小。
【文/觀察者網(wǎng)專欄作者 周波】
印度洋就是印度的洋嗎？無論這一問題看似多么荒謬，但如果你的交談對象是一個(gè)篤信“大婆羅多(Akhand Bharat)”構(gòu)想（即“不可分割的印度”）的印度教民族主義者，答案可能是肯定的。
在這套話語體系下，不僅印度洋成了“印度教徒的偉大海洋”(Hindu Mahasagar)，古婆羅多的地理版圖還包括現(xiàn)如今的阿富汗、緬甸、巴基斯坦、孟加拉國、中國西藏、尼泊爾、不丹、斯里蘭卡和馬爾代夫。
當(dāng)印度總理莫迪還是古吉拉特邦的首席部長時(shí)，他曾在2012年的一次采訪中說，應(yīng)該在文化統(tǒng)一的背景下看待“大婆羅多”。
然而，這種“大印度”的觀念迄今依然存在，這可能就是德里對周邊弱小鄰國習(xí)慣性以“老大哥”自居的原因之一。為嘗試改變這種狀況，莫迪總理在2014年第一個(gè)任期開始時(shí)，曾提出“鄰國優(yōu)先”政策，卻未能吸引住印度次大陸的鄰居們。德里自身的行為難辭其咎。
以斯里蘭卡為例。2014年，斯里蘭卡允許一艘中國潛艇在科倫坡?？?，引發(fā)了印度的強(qiáng)烈反對。然后，2017年，斯里蘭卡拒絕了一艘中國潛艇?？靠苽惼卵a(bǔ)給的請求，人們普遍認(rèn)為這是新德里向斯里蘭卡施壓的結(jié)果。
當(dāng)斯里蘭卡在今年7月12日宣布允許中國科考船“遠(yuǎn)望5號”將?？繚h班托塔港進(jìn)行補(bǔ)給時(shí)，印度又對此提出抗議，聲稱這關(guān)系到“印度的安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益”。這導(dǎo)致科倫坡要求中國科考船“遠(yuǎn)望5號”推遲其到港計(jì)劃。
針對印度媒體關(guān)于“遠(yuǎn)望5號”是“間諜船”的報(bào)道，中國外交部發(fā)言人汪文斌表示，“遠(yuǎn)望5號科考船進(jìn)行海洋科考活動(dòng)符合國際法和國際通行慣例，不影響任何國家的安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。”
“遠(yuǎn)望5號科考船抵達(dá)斯里蘭卡的漢班托塔港（圖源：法新社）
雖然科倫坡最終擱置新德里的抗議，允許該船在8月16日至22日泊靠，但令人警惕的是，印度已經(jīng)一次又一次地反對另一個(gè)國家行使主權(quán)，為中國船只進(jìn)行補(bǔ)給。
這就引出了一個(gè)問題：中國和印度能否在印度洋共存？
誓要成為印度洋“凈安全提供者”的印度，顯然不滿于中國在該地區(qū)日益增長的影響力。2020年中國和印度士兵在加勒萬河谷發(fā)生的致命斗毆事件，助長了印度的怨恨。一些印度戰(zhàn)略家甚至認(rèn)為，中國企圖從海上包抄印度。但這樣的分析顯然是對印度重要性的間接的自吹自擂，且顯示其對北京的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)解讀并不到位。中國有更緊迫的事務(wù)。在美國將中國視為其最大的戰(zhàn)略競爭對手的情況下，中國不得不與充滿敵意的美國抗衡，哪有時(shí)間圍堵印度。
中國在印度洋的利益
但這并不是說中國對印度洋沒有興趣。恰恰相反。要知道90%的全球貿(mào)易都是通過海路運(yùn)輸?shù)?。作為世界上最大的貿(mào)易國，中國自然會(huì)關(guān)注國際海上通道的安全。此外，中國在包括印度在內(nèi)的南亞國家有大量投資。2021年，中印雙邊貿(mào)易創(chuàng)下了1256億美元的歷史新高。這就解釋了為什么自2008年底以來，中國海軍一直不停地派出海軍編隊(duì)在印度洋進(jìn)行巡邏。2017年，中國在吉布提建立了第一個(gè)海外軍事基地，以保障反海盜行動(dòng)。
為了維護(hù)中國在印度洋不斷增長的利益，擁有世界上最大海軍的中國人民解放軍必須保持甚至加強(qiáng)其在印度洋的存在。因此，中國和印度的海軍艦艇勢必會(huì)更頻繁地在海上相遇。
中國航母打擊群出現(xiàn)在印度洋只是時(shí)間問題。屆時(shí)印度將如何應(yīng)對？
或者，設(shè)想最壞的情況，中國和印度會(huì)有一天在印度洋上發(fā)生沖突嗎？這種可能性雖然很低，但并不是零。2017年，中國和印度在中國和不丹之間的爭議地區(qū)洞朗對峙長達(dá)73天，沖突一觸即發(fā)。
印度軍事策略家們一貫認(rèn)為，盡管本國在中印邊境可能處于劣勢，但鑒于印度的地利之便，它在印度洋上肯定比中國有優(yōu)勢。
但這并不能保證印度海軍在潛在的沖突中能獲勝。印度不具備與中國進(jìn)行零和游戲的物質(zhì)條件。要知道中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)總量近乎印度的五倍，國防開支是印度的四倍。
印度在美國印太戰(zhàn)略中的角色
那么印度在美國遏制中國的印太戰(zhàn)略中會(huì)扮演什么角色？印度是“四方安全對話” 的成員國，這是一個(gè)由美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俱樂部，還包括日本和澳大利亞，成員氣味相投。由于其他三國已互為盟友，因此四方安全對話是否會(huì)在未來演變成一個(gè)反華俱樂部，很大程度上取決于印度的態(tài)度。到目前為止，印度還算是謹(jǐn)慎的。四方安全對話唯一的軍事部分是在孟加拉灣的馬拉巴爾舉行的海軍演習(xí)。不過，最近印度和美國宣布計(jì)劃在10月舉行一次聯(lián)合演習(xí)，演習(xí)地點(diǎn)距離中國和印度的實(shí)際控制線只不到100公里。
隨著中美競爭加劇，印度對美國的重要性必定會(huì)增加。但是，避免中美在印太地區(qū)的對抗，才最符合印度的國家利益。如果中美之間的競爭加劇，印度在印度洋的回旋余地就會(huì)隨之縮小。
如果印度真的奉行“鄰國優(yōu)先”，或許它應(yīng)該首先考慮好如何與更強(qiáng)大的鄰國—中國和睦相處。印度若執(zhí)意在與中國關(guān)系的問題上向周邊國家施壓，只會(huì)使這些鄰國與北京走得越來越近。
翻譯：中國論壇 蔣紹澄
核譯：中國論壇 許馨勻 韓樺
本文英文原文：
Is the Indian Ocean India’s ocean? However absurd this question might seem, the answer is probably yes if you talk to a Hindu nationalist who believes in Akhand Bharat (“undivided India”).
According to this concept, not only is the Indian Ocean Hind Mahasagar (an ocean of the Hindus), the geographic expanse of the ancient Bharat extended as far as modern-day Afghanistan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi was chief minister of Gujarat, he said in a 2012 interview that Akhand Bharat should be seen in the context of cultural unity.
Yet this notion of a Greater India persists and is probably one reason for Delhi’s habitual “big brother” attitude towards its smaller neighbours. Prime Minister Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy, introduced at the beginning of his first tenure in 2014, sought to change that. But the policy has not gained traction among India’s subcontinental neighbours and Delhi’s own actions are to blame.
Consider the example of Sri Lanka. In 2014, Sri Lanka allowed a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo, triggering fierce opposition from India. Then, in 2017, New Delhi was widely believed to have pressured Sri Lanka into rejecting a request from China to let a Chinese submarine dock in Colombo for resupply.
When Sri Lankan announced on July 12 this year that it would permit a Chinese research/survey vessel Yuan Wang 5 to dock at Hambantota Port for replenishment, India protested, saying it has a bearing on “India’s security and economic interests”. This caused Colombo to ask Beijing to defer the arrival of the Chinese ship.
In response to Indian media reports about the Yuan Wang 5 being a ‘spy ship’, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said the vessel was conducting scientific research “in accordance with international law” and “does not affect the security and economic interests of any country”.
Although Colombo set aside New Delhi’s protests and eventually allowedthe ship to berth from Aug 16-22, it is alarming that India has time and again objected to replenishment of Chinese ships by another state exercising its sovereign rights.
This prompts a question: could China and India coexist in the Indian Ocean?
Obviously, India, which vows to become a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean, is not happy with China’s growing influence in the region. The deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley in 2020 only added to India’s resentment. Some Indian strategists believe that China wants to encircle India from the sea. But such an analysis is an indirect form of self-praise of India’s importance and is off the mark in its reading of Beijing’s priorities; China has more pressing business. At a time when China has to contend with actions from a hostile United States, which sees it as its top strategic competitor, it would be too busy to encircle India.
CHINA’S INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
But that is not to say the Indian Ocean is of no interest to China. It is. Ninety per cent of global trade goes through the sea route. As the largest trading nation in the world, China is naturally concerned over the security of international sea lanes. Besides, China has huge investments in South Asian countries, including India. In 2021, China-India bilateral trade hit a record high of US$125.6 billion. This explains why since the end of 2008, the PLA Navy has been sending naval flotillas non-stop to patrol in the Indian Ocean. In 2017, it established its first military base in Djibouti to facilitate counter-piracy operations.
To safeguard its ever-growing interests in the Indian Ocean, the PLA, which has the largest navy in the world, has to maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean. Chinese and Indian naval vessels are bound to meet more often at sea.
It is only a matter of time before a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group shows up in the Indian Ocean. How will India react then?
Or, in the worst scenario, could China and India clash one day in the Indian Ocean? Such a likelihood is low, but not zero. In 2017, China and India nearly went to war in a face-off that lasted 73 days in Doklam, a disputed area between China and Bhutan.
India’s military planners traditionally believe that although the country may have a disadvantage along the China-India border, it certainly has an advantage over China at sea in the Indian Ocean, given India’s geographic proximity.
But there is no guarantee that the Indian Navy will prevail in a potential conflict. India does not have the material capabilities to engage in a zero-sum game with China. China’s economy is almost five times larger, and its defence spending four times larger than that of India.
INDIA IN AMERICA’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
And what role would India play in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy of containing China? India is a member of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) – a US-led club of like-minded members that also includes Japan and Australia. Whether it might evolve into an anti-China club in the future depends very much on India since the three other countries are already allies. So far, India is cautious. The only military component of Quad is a naval exercise in Malabar in the Bay of Bengal. Recently though India and the US announced plans to hold a joint exercise in October, less than 100km from the line of actual control between China and India.
With China-US competition expected to intensify, India’s importance to the US will surely grow. But India’s national interests are best served by avoiding China-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Should the rivalry between China and US intensify, India’s room to manoeuvre in the Indian Ocean will be reduced.
If India truly believes in “Neighbourhood First”, perhaps it should consider how to live in amity with its more powerful neighbour first. Pressuring its smaller neighbours on their relations with China will only drive them closer to Beijing.
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